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Quantitative results from a large class of international trade models depend critically on the elasticity
of trade with respect to trade frictions. We develop a simulated method of moments estimator to estimate
this elasticity from disaggregate price and trade-flow data using the Ricardian model. We motivate
our estimator by proving that the estimator developed in Eaton and Kortum (2002) is biased in any
finite sample. We quantitatively show that the bias is severe and that the data requirements necessary
to eliminate it in practice are extreme. Applying our estimator to new disaggregate price and trade-flow
data for 123 countries in the year 2004 yields a trade elasticity of roughly four, nearly fifty percent
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Quantitative results from a large class of structural gravity models of international trade
depend critically on a single parameter that governs the elasticity of trade with respect to
trade frictions.1 To illustrate how important this parameter is, consider three examples:
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) ﬁnd that the estimate of the tariff equivalent of the U.S.-
Canada border varies between 48 and 19 percent, depending on the assumed elasticity of
trade with respect to trade frictions. Yi (2003) points out that observed reductions in tariffs
can explain almost all or none of the growth in world trade, depending on this elasticity.
Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare (2011)argue that this parameteris one of only two
parameters needed to measure the welfare cost of autarky in a large and important class of
trade models. Therefore, this elasticity is key to understanding the size of the frictions to
trade, the response of trade to changes in tariffs, and the welfare gains or losses from trade.
Estimatingthisparameterisdifﬁcultbecausequantitative trademodelscanrationalizesmall
trade ﬂows with either large trade frictions and small elasticities, or small trade frictions and
large elasticities. Thus, one needssatisfactory measuresoftrade frictions independentoftrade
ﬂows to estimate this elasticity. Eaton and Kortum (2002) (henceforth EK) provide an inno-
vative and simple solution to this problem by arguing that, with product-level price data,
one could use the maximum price difference across goods between countries as a proxy for
bilateral trade frictions. Themaximum price difference betweentwo countries is meaningful
because itisbounded bythe trade friction between the two countries via simpleno-arbitrage
arguments.
We develop a new simulated method of moments estimator for the elasticity of trade in-
corporating EK’s intuition. The argument for a new estimator is that their method results
in estimates that are biased upward by economically signiﬁcant magnitudes. We prove this
result and then provide quantitative measures of the bias via Monte Carlo simulations of
the EK model. Finally, we apply our estimator to novel disaggregate price and trade-ﬂow
data for the year 2004, spanning 123 countries that account for 98 percent of world output.
Our benchmark estimate for the elasticity of trade is 4.12, rather than approximately eight,
as EK’s estimation strategy suggests. This difference doubles the measured welfare gains
from international trade across various models.
Since the elasticity of trade plays a key role in quantifying the welfare gains from trade, it is
important to understand why our estimates of the parameter differ substantially from EK’s.
1These models include Krugman (1980), Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Eaton and Kortum (2002),
and Melitz (2003) as articulated in Chaney (2008), which all generate log-linear relationships between bilateral
trade ﬂows and trade frictions.
1We show that the reason behind the difference is that their estimator is biased in ﬁnite sam-
ples of price data. The bias arises because the model’s equilibrium no-arbitrage conditions
imply that the maximum operator over a ﬁnite sample of prices underestimates the trade
cost with positive probability and overestimates the trade cost with zero probability. Conse-
quently, the maximum price difference lies strictly below the true trade cost, in expectation.
This implies that EK’s estimator delivers an elasticity of trade that lies strictly above the true
parameter, in expectation. As the sample size grows to inﬁnity, EK’s estimator can uncover
the true elasticity of trade, which necessarily implies that the bias in the estimates of the
parameter is eliminated.
Quantitatively, the bias is substantial. To illustrate its severity, we discretize EK’s model,
simulate trade ﬂows and product-level prices under an assumed elasticity of trade, and
apply their estimating approach on artiﬁcial data. Assuming a trade elasticity of 8.28, EK’s
preferred estimate for 19 OECD countries in 1990, the procedure suggests an estimate of
12.5, nearly 50-percent higher than originally postulated. Moreover, in practice, the true
parameter can be recovered when 50,000 goods are sampled across the 19 economies, which
constitutes an extreme data requirement to produce unbiased estimates of the elasticity of
trade.
Based on these arguments, we propose an estimator that is applicable when the sample
size of prices is small. Our approach builds on our insight that one can use observed bi-
lateral trade ﬂows to recover all sufﬁcient parameters to simulate EK’s model and obtain
trade ﬂows and prices as functions of the parameter of interest. This insight then suggests a
simulated method of moments estimator that minimizes the distance between the moments
obtained by applying EK’s approach on real and artiﬁcial data. We explore the properties
of this estimator numerically using simulated data and show that it can uncover the true
elasticity of trade.
Applying our estimator to alternative data sets and conducting several robustness exercises
allows us to establish a range for the elasticity of trade between 2.47 and 4.42. In contrast,
EK’s approach would have found a range of 4.17 and 7.75. Thus, our method ﬁnds elastic-
ities that are roughly half the size of EK’s approach. Because the inverse of this elasticity
linearly controls changes in real income necessary to compensate a representative consumer
for going to autarky, resolving this bias doubles the welfare gains from international trade.
The elasticity of trade has been a focus of many studies; see for example the seminal works
of Feenstra (1994) and Broda and Weinstein (2006), and Anderson and van Wincoop (2004)
for a survey. Like the existing literature, our estimation approach relies on the gravity equa-
tion of trade. Unlike the literature, our paper’s methodological insight is to exploit the
2particular micro-level structure of the EK model to correct for data limitations. As we show
quantitatively, this insight is powerful and has large welfare implications.
Finally, our estimation approach would not have been possible in models without hetero-
geneous outcomes such as Krugman (1980) and the Armington model of Anderson and van
Wincoop (2003). This is an important point in light of Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-
Clare’s(2011) arguments. While the newinternational trade models of EK, Melitz (2003)and
Chaney (2008) give the same formula for the welfare gains from trade as Krugman (1980)
or a simple Armington model would, their heterogenous micro-level structure enables re-
searchers to better estimate the elasticity of trade with a gravity-based estimator. Our paper
illustrates this point and thus provides an alternative rationale for the value added of new
heterogenous production models of trade.
2. Model
We outline the environment of the multi-country Ricardian model of trade introduced by
EK. We consider a world with N countries, where each country has a tradable ﬁnal-goods
sector. There is a continuum of tradable goods indexed by j ∈ [0,1].
Within each country i, there is a measure of consumers Li. Each consumer has one unit of
time supplied inelastically in the domestic labor market and enjoys the consumption of a
CES bundle of ﬁnal tradable goods with elasticity of substitution ρ > 1:
Ui =








To produce quantity xi(j) in country i, a ﬁrm employs labor using a linear production func-
tion with productivity zi(j). Country i’s productivity is, in turn, the realization of a random





The country-speciﬁc parameter Ti > 0 governs the location of the distribution; higher values
of it imply that a high productivity draw for any good j is more likely. The parameter θ > 1
is common across countries and, if higher, it generates less variability in productivity across
goods.
Having drawn a particular productivity level, a perfectly competitive ﬁrm from country
3i incurs a marginal cost to produce good j of wi/zi(j), where wi is the wage rate in the
economy. Shipping the good to a destination n further requires a per-unit iceberg trade cost
of τni > 1 for n  = i, with τii = 1. We assume that cross-border arbitrage forces effective
geographic barriers to obey the triangle inequality: For any three countries i,k,n, τni ≤
τnkτki.
Below, we describe equilibrium prices, trade ﬂows, and welfare.
Perfect competition forces the price of good j from country i to destination n to be equal to





So, consumers in destination n would pay pni(j), should they decide to buy good j from
country i.
Consumers purchase good j from the low-cost supplier; thus, the actual price consumers in







The pricing rule and the productivity distribution allow us to obtain the following CESexact
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1−ρ is the Gamma function, and parameters are re-
stricted such that θ > ρ − 1.
To calculate trade ﬂows between countries, let Xn be country n’s expenditure on ﬁnal goods,
of which Xni is spent on goods from country i. Since there is a continuum of goods, comput-
ing the fraction of income spent on imports from i, Xni/Xn, can be shown to be equivalent
to ﬁnding the probability that country i is the low-cost supplier to country n given the joint
distribution of efﬁciency levels, prices, and trade costs for any good j. The expression for
the share of expenditures that country n spends on goods from country i or, as we will call







4Expressions (3) and (4) allow us to relate trade shares to trade costs and the price indices of
















Xi is country i’s expenditure share on goods from country i, or its home trade share.
In this model, it is easy to show that the welfare gains from trade are essentially captured
by changes in the CES price index a representative consumer faces. Because of the tight
link between prices and trade shares, this model generates the following relationship be-














where the left-hand side can be interpreted as the percentage compensation a representative
consumer in country n requires to move between two trading equilibria.
Expression (5) is not particular to EK’s model. Several popular models of international
trade relate trade shares, prices and trade costs in the same exact manner. These models
include the Armington framework of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), as well as, the
monopolistic competition frameworks of ﬁrm heterogeneity by Melitz (2003) and Chaney
(2008), and ﬁrm homogeneity byKrugman (1980). Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare
(2011) show how equation (6) arises within these same models.
2.1. The Elasticity of Trade
The key parameter determining trade ﬂows (equation (5)) and welfare (equation (6)) is θ. To






= −θlog(τni) − θlog(Pi) + θlog(Pn). (7)
As this expression makes clear, θ controls how a change in the bilateral trade costs, τni,
will change bilateral trade between two countries. This elasticity is important because if
one wants to understand how a bilateral trade agreement will impact aggregate trade or to
simply understand the magnitude of the trade friction between two countries, then a stand
on this elasticity is necessary. This is what we mean by the elasticity of trade.
5Toseetheparameter’simportance forwelfare, itisfairlyeasytodemonstrate that(6)implies












increase in consumer welfare. Thus, in order to measure the impact of trade policy on wel-
fare, it is sufﬁcient to obtain data on realized domestic expenditures and an estimate of the
elasticity of trade.
Given θ’s impact on trade ﬂows and welfare, this elasticity is absolutely critical in any quan-
titative study of international trade.
3. Estimating θ: EK’s Approach
Equation (5) suggests that one could easily estimate θ if one had data on trade shares, ag-
gregate prices, and trade costs. The key issue is that trade costs are not observed. In this
section, we discuss how EK approximate trade costs and estimate θ. Then, we character-
ize the statistical properties of EK’s estimator. The key result is Proposition 1, which states
that their estimator is biased and overestimates the elasticity of trade with a ﬁnite sample
of prices. The second result is Proposition 2, which states that EK’s estimator is a consistent
and an asymptotically unbiased estimator of the elasticity of trade.
3.1. Approximating Trade Costs
To estimate θ, the key problem is that one must disentangle trade costs from θ, when direct
measures of trade costs are not observed. EK propose approximating trade costs in the
following way. The idea is that by using disaggregate price information across countries, the
maximum price difference between two countries bounds the trade cost and, thus, solves
the indeterminacy issue.
To illustrate this argument, suppose that we observe the price of good ℓ across locations,
but we do not know its country of origin.2 We know that the price of good ℓ in country n
2This is the most common case, though Donaldson (2009)exploits a case where he knows the place of origin
for one particular good, salt. He argues convincingly that in India, salt was produced in only a few locations
and exported everywhere; thus, the relative price of salt across locations identiﬁes the trade friction.




That is, the relative price of good ℓ must be less than or equal to the trade friction. This
inequality must hold because if it does not, then pn(ℓ) > τnipi(ℓ) and an agent could import
ℓ at a lower price. Thus, the inequality in (9) places a lower bound on the trade friction.
Improvements on this bound are possible if we observe a sample of L goods across loca-









This suggests a way to exploit disaggregate price information across countries and to arrive
at an estimate of τni by taking the maximum of relative prices over goods. Thus, EK approx-
imate τni, in logs, by
log ˆ τni(L) = max
ℓ∈L
{log(pn(ℓ)) − log(pi(ℓ))}, (11)
where the “hat” denotes the approximated value of τni and (L) indexes its dependence on
the sample size of prices.
3.2. Estimating the Elasticity
Given the approximation of trade costs, EK simply take equation (7) and run a regression.









log ˆ τni(L) + log ˆ Pi − log ˆ Pn
 
, (12)
where log ˆ τni(L) = max
ℓ∈L
{logpn(ℓ) − logpi(ℓ)},






7As discussed, the second line of expression (12) approximates the trade cost. The third
line approximates the aggregate price indices. The top line relates these observables to the
regression they run.
To recover β, EK employ a method of moments estimator by taking the average of the left-
hand side of (12) divided by the average of the right-hand side of (12), with the averages
across all country pairs.3
Mathematically, their estimator is:














log ˆ τni(L) + log ˆ Pi − log ˆ Pn
 . (13)
The value of β is EK’s preferred estimate of the elasticity θ.4 Throughout, we will denote by
ˆ β the estimator deﬁned in equation (13) to distinguish it from the value θ.
3.3. Properties of EK’s Estimator
Before proving properties of the estimator ˆ β, we want to be clear about the sources of ran-
domness in equation (12). We view the trade data on the left-hand side of (12) as being
ﬁxed. The variables on the right-hand side of (12) are random variables. That is, we are
treating the micro-level prices as being randomly sampled from the equilibrium distribu-
tion of prices. The parameterization of productivity draws in equation (1), marginal cost
pricing, and equation (2) are sufﬁcient to characterize these distributions. This interpreta-
tion is consistent with EK’s interpretation.
Given that random variation in the sampled prices is the source of randomness, we deﬁne
the following objects.
Deﬁnition 1 Deﬁne the following objects
1. Let ǫni = θ[logpn − logpi] be the log price difference of a good between country n and country
i, multiplied by θ.





3They also propose two other estimators. One uses the approximation in (11) and the gravity equation in
(22) — our arguments are applicable to this approach as well. The other approach does not use disaggregate
price data and this estimate is remarkably similar to our benchmark results.
4To alleviate measurement error, they resort to using the second-order statistic over price differences rather
than the ﬁrst-order statistic. Our estimation approach is robust to the consideration of using the ﬁrst- or
second-order statistic.
83. Let the vector ˜ τi = {θlog(τi1),...,θlog(τiN)} and let ˜ τ be a matrix with typical row, ˜ τi.
4. Let g(pi;S, ˜ τi) be the pdf of prices of individual goods in country i, pi ∈ (0,∞).
5. Let fmax(ǫni;L,S, ˜ τi, ˜ τn) be the pdf of max(ǫni), given prices of a sample L ≥ 1 of goods.






The ﬁrst item is simply the scaled log price difference. As we show in Appendix B.1, this
happens to be convenient to work with, as the second line in (12) can be restated in terms
of scaled log price differences across locations. The second item is a vector in which each
element is a function of a country’s technology parameter and wage rate. The third item
is a matrix of log bilateral trade costs, scaled by θ, with a typical vector row containing the
trade costs that country i’s trading partners incur to sell there. The fourth item speciﬁes
the probability distribution of prices in each country. The ﬁfth item speciﬁes the probability
distribution over the maximum scaled log price difference andits dependenceon the sample
size of prices of L goods. We derive this distribution in Appendix B.1. Finally, the sixth item
summarizes trade data, which we view as constant.
3.4. ˆ β is a Biased Estimator of θ
Given these deﬁnitions, we establish two intermediate results and then state Proposition 1,
which characterizes the expectation of ˆ β, shows that the estimator is biased and discusses
the reason why the bias arises. The proof of Proposition 1 can be found in Appendix B.1.
The ﬁrst intermediate result is the following:
Lemma 1 Consider an economy of N countries with a sample of L goods’ prices observed. The
expected value of the maximal difference of logged prices for a pair of countries is strictly less than
the true trade cost,
Ψni(L;S, ˜ τi, ˜ τn) ≡
1
θ
  θ log(τni)
−θlog(τin)
ǫnifmax(ǫni;L,S, ˜ τi, ˜ τn)dǫni < log(τni). (14)
The difference in the expected values of logged prices for a pair of countries equals the difference in
the price parameters, Φ, of the two countries,
Ωni(S, ˜ τn, ˜ τi) ≡
  ∞
0
log(pn)g(pn;S, ˜ τn)dpn −
  ∞
0





with Φn deﬁned in equation (3).
9The key result in Lemma 1 is the strict inequality in (14). It says that Ψni, the expected maxi-
mal logged price difference, is less than the true trade cost. Two forces drive this result. First,
with a ﬁnite sample L of prices, there is positive probability that the maximal logged price
difference will be less than the true trade cost. In other words, there is always a chance that
the weak inequality in (10) does not bind. Second, there is zero probability that the maximal
logged price difference can be larger than the true trade cost. This comes from optimality
and the deﬁnition of equilibrium. These two forces imply that the expected maximal logged
price difference lies strictly below the true trade cost.
The second result in Lemma 1 is that the difference in the expected log prices in expression
(15) equals the difference in the aggregate price parameters deﬁned in equation (3). This
result is important because it implies that any source of bias in the estimator ˆ β does not
arise because of systematic errors in approximating the price parameter Φn.
The next intermediate step computes the expected value of 1/ˆ β. This step is convenient
because the inverse of ˆ β is linear in the random variables that Lemma 1 characterizes.
Lemma 2 Consider an economy of N countries with a sample of L goods’ prices observed. The






















































This results says that the expected value of the inverse of ˆ β equalsthe inverse of the elasticity
multiplied bythe bracketed term of(17). Thebracketed term isthe expectedmaximal logged
price difference minus the difference in expected logged prices, both scaled by theta, and
divided by trade data. This term is strictly less than one because Ψni does not equal the
trade cost, as established in Lemma 1. If Ψni did equal the trade cost, then the bracketed
term would equal one, and the expected value of the inverse of ˆ β would be equal to the
inverse of θ. This can be seen by examining the relation between Φs and aggregate prices Ps
in (3), and by substituting expression (7) into (17).
Inverting (16) and then applying Jensen’s inequality establishes the main result: that EK’s
estimator is biased above the true value of θ.
10Proposition 1 Consider an economy of N countries with a sample of L goods’ prices observed. The


























The proposition establishes that the estimator ˆ β provides estimates that exceed the true
value of the elasticity θ. The weak inequality in (18) comes from applying Jensen’s inequal-
ity to the strictly convex function of ˆ β, 1/ˆ β. The strict inequality follows from Lemma 1,
which argued that the expected maximal logged price difference is strictly less than the true
trade cost. Thus, the bracketed term in expression (18) is always greater than one and the
elasticity of trade is always overestimated.
3.5. Consistency and Asymptotic Bias
Whilethe estimator ˆ β isbiasedina ﬁnitesample, the asymptotic properties ofEK’sestimator
are worth understanding. Proposition 2 summarizes the result. The proof to Proposition 2
can be found in Appendix B.2.
Proposition 2 Consider an economy of N countries. The maximallog pricedifferenceis a consistent





(logpn(ℓ) − logpi(ℓ)) = logτni. (19)
The estimator ˆ β is a consistent estimator of θ,
plim
L→∞
ˆ β (L;S, ˜ τ,X) = θ, (20)





ˆ β (L;S, ˜ τ,X)
 
− θ = 0. (21)
There are three elements to Proposition 2, each building on the previous one. The ﬁrst
statement says that the probability limit of the maximal log price difference equals the true
trade cost between two countries. Intuitively, this says that as the sample size becomeslarge,
the probability that the weak inequality in (10) does not bind becomes vanishingly small.
11The second statement says that the estimator ˆ β converges in probability to the elasticity
of trade—i.e., ˆ β is a consistent estimator of θ. The reasons are the following. Because the
maximal price difference converges in probability to the true trade cost, and the difference
in averages of log prices converges in probability to the difference in price parameters, 1/ˆ β
converges in probability to 1/θ. Since 1/ˆ β is a continuous function of ˆ β (with ˆ β > 0), ˆ β
must converge in probability to θ because of the preservation of convergence for continuous
functions (see Hayashi (2000)).
The third statement says that, in the limit, the bias is eliminated. This follows immediately
from the argument that ˆ β is a consistent estimator of θ (see Hayashi (2000)).
The results in Proposition 2 are important for two reasons. First, they suggest that with
enough data, EK’s estimator provides informative estimates of the elasticity of trade. How-
ever, aswewill showin the next section, Monte Carloexercises suggest thatthe data require-
ments are extreme. Second, because EK’s estimator has desirable asymptotic properties, it
underlies the simulation-based estimator that we develop in Section 5.
4. How Large is the Bias? How Much Data is Needed?
Proposition 1 shows EK’s estimator is biased in a ﬁnite sample. Many estimators have this
property, which raises the question: How large is the bias? Furthermore, even if the mag-
nitude of the bias is large, perhaps only moderate increases in the sample size are sufﬁcient
to eliminate the bias (in practical terms). The natural question is then: How much data is
needed to achieve that?
To answer these questions, we perform Monte Carlo experiments in which we simulate
trade ﬂows and samples of micro-level prices under a known θ. Then, we apply EK’s esti-
mator to the artiﬁcial data. We employ the same simulation procedure described in Steps 1-3
in Section 5.2 and we estimate all parameters (except for θ) using the trade data from EK. We
set the true value of θ equal to 8.28, which is EK’s estimate when employing the approach
described above. The sample size of prices is set to L = 50, which is the number of prices
EK had access to in their data set.
Table 1 presents the ﬁndings. The columns of Table 1 present the mean and median es-
timates of β over 100 simulations. The rows present two different estimation approaches:
method of moments and least squares with suppressed constant. Also reported are the true
average trade cost and the estimated average trade cost using maximal log price differences.
The ﬁrst row in Table 1 shows that the estimates using EK’s approach are larger than the
12Table 1: Monte Carlo Results, True θ = 8.28
Approach Mean Estimate of θ (S.E.) Median Estimate of θ
EK’s Estimator 12.5 (0.06) 12.5
Least Squares 11.8 (0.06) 11.8
True Mean τ = 1.79 Estimated Mean τ = 1.48
Note: S.E. is the standard error of the mean. In each simulation there are 19 countries and
500,000 goods. Only 50 realized prices are randomly sampled and used to estimate θ. 100
simulations performed.
true θ of 8.28, which is consistent with Proposition 1. The key source of bias in Proposition
1 was that the estimates of the trade costs were biased downward, as Lemma 1 argued. The
ﬁnal row in Table 1 illustrates that the estimated trade costs are below the true trade costs,
where the latter correspond to an economy characterized by a true elasticity of trade among
19 OECD countries of 8.28.
The second row in Table 1 reports results using a least squares estimator with the constant
suppressed rather than the method of moments estimator.5 Similar to the method of mo-
ments estimates, the least squares estimates are substantially larger than the true value of
θ. This is important because it suggests that the key problem with EK’s approach is not the
method of moment estimator per se, but, instead, the poor approximation of the trade costs.
The ﬁnal point to note is that the magnitude of the bias is substantial. The underlying θ was
set equal to 8.28, and the estimates in the simulation are between 11.8 and 12.5. Equation (8)
can be used to formulate the welfare cost of the bias. It suggests that the welfare gains from
trade will be underestimated by 50 percent as a result of the bias.
How much data is needed to eliminate the bias? Table 2 provides a quantitative answer. It
performs the same Monte Carlo experiments described above, as the sample size of micro-
level prices varies.
Table 2 shows that, as the sample size becomes larger, the estimate of θ becomes less biased
and begins to approach the true value of θ. The ﬁnal column shows how the reduction
in the bias coincides with the estimates of the trade costs becoming less biased. This is
consistent with the arguments of Proposition 2, which describes the asymptotic properties
5Including a constant in least squares results in slope coefﬁcient that underestimate the true elasticity. This
result is symptomatic of an “errors in variables” problem.
13Table 2: Increasing the Sample of Prices Reduces the Bias, True θ = 8.28
Sample Size of Prices Mean θ (S.E.) Median θ Mean τ
50 12.51 (0.06) 12.50 1.48
500 9.34 (0.02) 9.32 1.68
5,000 8.43 (0.01) 8.43 1.77
50,000 8.30 (0.002) 8.30 1.78
Note: S.E. is the standard error of the mean. In each simulation, there are 19 countries and
500,000 goods. The results reported use least squares with the constant suppressed. 100 simu-
lations performed. True Mean τ = 1.79.
of this estimator.
We should note that the rate of convergence is extremely slow; even with a sample size of
5,000, the estimate of β ismeaningfully larger than the value generating the data. Only when
50,000 prices are sampled does the estimate approach the true value. This exercise allows
us to conclude that the data requirements to minimize the bias in estimates of the elasticity
of trade (in practice) are extreme. This motivates our alternative estimation strategy in the
next section.
5. A New Approach To Estimating θ
In this section, we develop a new approach to estimating θ and discuss its performance on
simulated data.
5.1. The Idea
Our idea is to exploit the structure of the model in the following way. First, in Section 5.2,
we show how to recover all parameters necessary to simulate the model up to the unknown
scalar θ from trade data only. These parameters are the vector S and the scaled trade costs
in matrix ˜ τ. Given these values, we can simulate moments from the model as functions of θ.
Second, Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 actually suggest which moments are informative. Inspec-
tion of the integral (14) and the density fmax in (b.28) leads to the observation that the ex-
pected maximal log price difference monotonically varies with θ and linearly with 1/θ. This
follows because of the previous point—the vector S and scaled log trade costs ˜ τ are pinned
down by trade data, and these values completely determine all parameters in the integral
14(14), except the value 1/θ lying outside the integral. Similarly, the integral (15) is completely
determined by these values and scaled in the same way by 1/θ as (14) is.
These observations have the following implication. Whilethe maximum log price difference
is biased below the true trade cost, if θ is large, then the value of the maximum log price
difference will be small. Similarly, if θ is small, then the value of the maximum log price
difference will be large. A large or small maximum log price difference will result in a small
or large estimate of ˆ β. This suggests that the estimator ˆ β will vary monotonically with the
true value of θ. Furthermore, this suggests that ˆ β is an informative moment with regard to
θ.6
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Figure 1: Schematic of Estimation Approach
Figure 1 quantitatively illustrates this intuition by plotting β(θ) from simulations as we
varied θ. It is clear that β is a biased estimator because these values do not lie on the 45o line.
However, β varies near linearly with θ. These observations suggest an estimation procedure
that matches the data moment β to the moment β(θ) implied by the simulated model under
a known θ.7 Because of the monotonicity implied by our arguments, the known θ must be
the unique value that satisﬁes the moment condition speciﬁed.
6While we have not shown this formally, it can be shown that the expected value of 1/ˆ β is proportional to
1/θ. Modulo effects from Jensen’s inequality, this suggests that ˆ β is proportional to θ. Figure 1 conﬁrms this.
7Another reason for using the moment β is that it is a consistent estimator of θ, as argued in Proposition 2.
155.2. Simulation Approach
We show how to recover all parameters of interest up to the unknown scalar θ from trade
data only, and then we describe our simulation approach. This provides the foundations for
the simulated method of moments estimator we propose.
Step 1.—We estimate parameters for the country-speciﬁc productivity distributions and
trade costs from bilateral trade-ﬂow data. We perform this step by following EK and Waugh
(2010b)and deriving the gravity equation from expression (4), bydividing the bilateral trade






= Si − Sn − θlogτni, (22)






and is the same value in the parameter vector S in Deﬁ-
nition 1. Note that this is a different equation than expression (5), which is derived by di-
viding the bilateral trade share by the exporting country’s home trade share, and is used to
estimate θ. Sis are recovered as the coefﬁcients on country-speciﬁc dummy variables given
the restrictions on how trade costs can covary across countries. Following the arguments of
Waugh (2010b), trade costs take the following functional form:
log(τni) = dk + bni + exi + νni. (23)
Here, trade costs are a logarithmic function of distance, where dk with k = 1,2,...,6 is the
effect of distance between country i and n lying in the kth distance intervals.8 bni is the effect
of a shared border in which bni = 1, ifcountry iand n share a border and zero otherwise. The
term exi isanexporterﬁxedeffectandallowsforthetrade-cost leveltovarydependingupon
the exporter. We assume that νni reﬂects other factors and is orthogonal to the regressors
and normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation σν. We use least squares
to estimate equations (22) and (23).
Step 2.—The parameter estimates obtained from the ﬁrst-stage gravity regression are sufﬁ-
cient to simulate trade ﬂows and micro-level prices up to a constant, θ.
The relationship is obvious in the estimation of trade barriers since log(τni) is scaled by θ in
(22). To see that we can simulate micro-level prices as a function of θ only, notice that for
any good j, pni(j) = τniwi/zi(j). Thus, rather than simulating productivities, it is sufﬁcient
8Intervals are in miles: [0,375); [375,750); [750,1500); [1500,3000); [3000,6000); and [6000,maximum]. An
alternative to specifying a trade-cost function is to recover scaled trade costs as a residual using equation (5),
trade data, and measures of aggregate prices as in Waugh (2010a).
16to simulate the inverse of marginal costs of production ui(j) = zi(j)/wi. In Appendix B.3,







, with ˜ Si = exp(Si) = Tiw
−θ
i . (24)
Thus, having obtained the coefﬁcients Si from the ﬁrst-stage gravity regression, we can sim-
ulate the inverse of marginal costs and prices.
Tosimulate the model, we assume thatthere are alarge number(150,000)ofpotentially trad-
able goods. In Section 8.1, we discuss how we made this choice and the motivation behind
it. For each country, the inverse marginal costs are drawn from the country-speciﬁc distri-
bution (24) and assigned to each good. Then, for each importing country and each good,
the low-cost supplier across countries is found, realized prices are recorded, and aggregate
bilateral trade shares are computed.
Step 3.—From the realized prices, a subset of goods common to all countries is deﬁned and
the subsample of prices is recorded – i.e., we are acting as if we were collecting prices for
the international organization that collects the data. We added disturbances to the predicted
trade shares with the disturbances drawn from a mean zero normal distribution with the
standard deviation set equal to the standard deviation of the residuals from Step 1.
These steps then provide us with an artiﬁcial data set of micro-level prices and trade shares
mimicking their analogs in the data. Given this artiﬁcial data set, we can then compute
moments—as a function of θ—to compare to moments in the data.
5.3. Estimation
Below, we describe the moments we try to match and the formalities of our estimation pro-
cedure.
5.3.1. Moments
In this section, we deﬁne the moments of interest. We perform two estimations: one overi-
dentiﬁed procedure with two moments and an exactly identiﬁed procedure with one mo-
ment.
Deﬁne βk as EK’s method of moment estimator deﬁned in (12) using the kth-order statistic
















ni(L) + log ˆ Pi − log ˆ Pn
 , k = 1,2 (25)
where ˆ τk
ni(L) is computed as the kth-order statistic over L micro-level price differences be-
tween countries n and i. In the exactly identiﬁed estimation, we use β1 as the only moment.
We denote the simulated moments by β1(θ,us) and β2(θ,us), which come from the analo-
gous formula as in (25) and are estimated from artiﬁcial data generated by following Steps
1-3 above. Note that these moments are a function of θ and depend upon a vector of ran-
dom variables us associated with a particular simulation s. There are three components
to this vector. First, there are the random productivity draws for production technologies
for each good and each country. The second component is the set of goods sampled from
all countries. The third component mimics the residuals νni from equation (22), which are
described in Section 5.2.



















We base our estimation procedure on the moment condition:
E [y(θo)] = 0,
where θo is the true value of θ. Thus, our simulated method of moments estimator is
ˆ θ = argmin
θ
[y(θ)
′ W y(θ)], (27)
where W is a 2 × 2 weighting matrix that we discuss below.
The idea behind this moment condition is that, though β1 and β2 will be biased away from
θ, the moments β1(θ,us) and β2(θ,us) will be biased by the same amount when evaluated
at θo, in expectation. Viewed in this language, our moment condition is closely related to
the estimation of bias functions discussed in MacKinnon and Smith (1998) and to indirect
18inference, as discussed in Smith (2008). The key issue in MacKinnon and Smith (1998) is
how the bias function behaves. As we argued in Section 5.1, the bias is monotonic in the
parameter of interest and Figure 1 shows that it is basically linear and, thus, is well behaved.
For the weighting matrix, we use the optimal weighting matrix suggested by Gouri´ eroux
and Monfort (1996) for simulated method of moments estimators. Because the weighting
matrix depends upon our estimate of θ, we used a standard iterative procedure outlined in
the next steps.
Step 4.—We make an initial guess of the weighting matrix W
0 and solve for ˆ θ0. Then, given
this value we simulate the model to generate a new estimate of the weighting matrix.9 With
the new estimate of the weighting matrix we then solve for a new ˆ θ1. We perform this
iterative procedure until our estimates of the weighting matrix and ˆ θ converge. We explicitly
consider simulation error because we utilize the weighting matrix suggested by Gouri´ eroux
and Monfort (1996).
Step 5.—We compute standard errors using a bootstrap technique. We compute residu-
als implied by the estimator in (25) and the ﬁtted values, we resample the residuals with
replacement, and we generate a new set of data using the ﬁtted values. Using the data
constructed from each resampling b, we computed new estimates βb
1 and βb
2.
For each bootstrap b, we replace the moments β1 and β2 with bootstrap-generated moments
βb
1 and βb
2. To account for simulation error, a new seed is set to generate a new set of model-












We repeat this exercise 100 times and compute the estimated standard error of our estimate








b − ˆ θ)(ˆ θ





This procedure for constructing standard errors is similar in spirit to the approach of Eaton,
Kortum, and Kramarz (2011), who use a simulated method of moments estimator to esti-
mate the parameters of a similar trade model from the performance of French exporters.
9The computation of this matrix is described in Gouri´ eroux and Monfort (1996).
195.4. Performance on Simulated Data
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our estimation approach using simulated
data when we know the true value of θ.
Table 3 presents the results from the following exercise. We generate an artiﬁcial data set of
trade ﬂows and disaggregate prices with true value of θ equal to 8.28 and 4.00, and then we
apply our estimation routine.10 We repeat this procedure 100 times. Table 3 reports average
estimates. The sequence of artiﬁcial data is the same for both the overidentiﬁed case and
exactly identiﬁed case to facilitate comparisons across estimators.
The ﬁrst row presents the average value of our simulated method of moments estimate,
which is 8.29 with a standard error of 0.03. For all practical purposes, the estimation routine
recovers the true value of θ generating the data. To emphasize our estimator’s performance,
the next two rows of Table 3 present the approach of EK (which also corresponds to the
moments used). Though not surprising given the discussion above, this approach generates
estimates of θ that are signiﬁcantly (in both their statistical and economic meaning) higher
than the true value of θ of 8.28.
Table 3: Estimation Results With Artiﬁcial Data
Estimation Approach True θ = 8.28 True θ = 4.00
Overidentiﬁed Mean Estimate of θ (S.E.) Mean Estimate of θ (S.E.)
SMM 8.29 (0.03) 3.99 (0.02)
Moment, β1 12.47 (0.05) 6.03 (0.03)
Moment, β2 15.20 (0.05) 7.34 (0.03)
Exactly Identiﬁed
SMM 8.24 (0.04) 3.98 (0.02)
Moment, β1 12.47 (0.05) 6.03 (0.03)
Note: In each simulation there are 19 countries, 150,000goods and 100 simulations performed. The
sequence of artiﬁcial data is the same for both the overidentiﬁed case and exactly identiﬁed case.
The ﬁnal two rows present the exactly identiﬁed case when we use only one moment to
estimate θ. In this case, we use β1. Similar to the overidentiﬁed case, the average value of
our simulated method of moments estimate is 8.24 with a standard error of 0.04. Again, this
is effectively the true value of θ.
10To generate the artiﬁcial data set, we employ the same simulation procedure described in Steps 1-3 in
Section 5.2 using the trade data from EK.
20Table 4: Comparison to Alternative Statistical Approaches to Bias Reduction
True θ = 8.28 True θ = 4.00
Estimation Approach Mean Estimate of θ (S.E.) Mean Estimate of θ (S.E.)
SMM 8.29 (0.03) 3.99 (0.02)
Robson and Whitlock (1964) 10.54 (0.07) 5.11 (0.03)
Moment, β1 12.47 (0.05) 6.03 (0.03)
Note: In each simulation there are 19 countries, 150,000 goods and 100 simulations performed. The se-
quence of artiﬁcial data is the same for all cases.
The second column reports the results when the true value of θ is set equal to 4.00. The esti-
mates using our estimator are 3.99 and 3.98 in the overidentiﬁed and the exactly identiﬁed
case, respectively. Similar to the previous results, these values are effectively the true value
of θ. Furthermore, the alternative approaches that correspond to the moments we used in
our estimation are biased away from the true value of θ.
We also compare our estimation approach to an alternative statistical approach to bias re-
duction, which does not depend on the model’s explicit distributional assumptions. Robson
and Whitlock (1964) propose a way to reduce the bias when estimating the truncation point
of a distribution. This problem is analogous to estimating the trade cost from price differ-
ences. This can be seen by inspecting the integral in (14) ofLemma 1. Robson and Whitlock’s
(1964) approach would suggest (in our notation) an estimator of the trade cost of 2ˆ τ1
ni − ˆ τ2
ni,
or two times the ﬁrst-order statistic minus the second-order statistic. This makes intuitive
sense because it increases the ﬁrst-order statistic by the difference between the ﬁrst- and
second-order statistic. They show that this estimator is as efﬁcient as the ﬁrst-order statistic
but with less bias.11
We follow their approach to approximate the trade friction and then use it as an input into
the simple method of moments estimator. We compare the results from this estimation pro-
cedure to the results obtained using our SMM estimator. Table 4 presents the results. The
second row reports the results when using Robson and Whitlock’s (1964) approach to re-
duce the bias in the estimator of the trade friction. This approach reduces the bias relative to
using the ﬁrst-order statistic (EK’s approach) reported in the third row. It is not, however, a
complete solution, asthe estimates are still meaningfully higher than both the true value of θ
and the estimates from our estimation approach. This suggests that exploiting the structure
11Robson and Whitlock (1964) provide more-general reﬁnements using inner-order statistics, but methods
using inner-order statistics will have very low efﬁciency. Cooke (1979) provides an alternative bias reduction
technique but only considers cases in which the sample size (L in our notation) is large.
21of the model has content because it outperforms a naive statistical procedure.
Overall, we view these results as evidence supporting our estimation approach and empir-
ical estimates of θ presented in Section 6 below.
6. Empirical Results
In this section, we apply our estimation strategy described in section 5 to several different
data sets. The key ﬁnding of this section is that our estimation approach yields an estimate
around four, in contrast to previous estimation strategies, which yield estimates around
eight.
6.1. Baseline Results Using New ICP 2005 Data
6.1.1. New ICP 2005 Data
Our sample contains 123 countries. We use trade ﬂows and production data for the year
2004 to construct trade shares. The price data used to compute aggregate price indices and
proxies for trade costs come from basic-heading-level data from the 2005 round of the Inter-
national Comparison Programme (ICP). The ICP collects price data on goods with identical
characteristics across retail locations in the participating countries during the 2003-2005 pe-
riod.12 The basic-heading level represents a narrowly-deﬁned group of goods for which
expenditure data are available. The data set contains a total of 129 basic headings, and we
reduce the sample to 62 categories based on their correspondence with the trade data em-
ployed. Appendix A.2 provides more details.
On its own, this data set provides two contributions to the existing literature. First, because
this is the latest round of the ICP, the measurement issues are less severe than in previous
rounds. Furthermore, this data set provides very extensive coverage, as it includes as many
as 123 developing and developed countries that account for 98 percent of world output.
The ICP provides a common list of “representative” goods whose prices are to be randomly
sampled in each country over a certain period of time. A good is representative of a coun-
try if it comprises a signiﬁcant share of a typical consumer’s bundle there. Thus, the ICP
samples the prices of a common basket of goods across countries, where the goods have
been pre-selected due to their highly informative content for the purpose of international
comparisons.
12The ICP Methodological Handbook is available at http://go.worldbank.org/MW520NNFK0.
22EK’s model gives a natural common basket of goods to be priced across countries. In this
model, the agents in all countries consume all goods that lie within a ﬁxed interval, [0,1].
Thus, we consider this common list in the simulated model and randomly sample the prices
of its goods across countries, in order to approximate trade barriers, much like it is done in
the ICP data.
6.1.2. Results—New ICP 2005 Data
Table 5 presents the results.13 The ﬁrst row simply reports the moments that our estimation
procedure targets. As discussed, these values correspond with EK’s estimate of θ.
Table 5: Estimation Results With 2005 ICP Data
Estimate of θ (S.E.) β1 β2
Data Moments — 7.75 9.61
Exactly Identiﬁed Case 4.12 (0.02) 7.75 —
Overidentiﬁed Case 4.06 (0.01) 7.65 9.62
The second row reports the results for exactly identiﬁed estimation, where the underlying
moment used is β1. In this instance, our estimate of θ is 4.12, roughly half of EK’s estimate
of θ.
The third row reports the results for the overidentiﬁed estimation. The estimate of θ is4.06—
almost the same as in our exactly identiﬁed estimation and, again, roughly half of EK’s
estimate. The second and third columns report the resulting moments from the estimation
routine, which are close to the data moments targeted, given that only one parameter is used
to match two moments.
6.2. Estimates Using EK’s Data
In this section, we apply our estimation strategy to the same data used in EK as another
check of our estimation procedure. Their data set consists of bilateral trade data for 19
OECD countries in 1990 and 50 prices of manufactured goods for all countries. The prices
come from an earlier round of the ICP, which considered only OECD countries. Similar
13The results from the Step 1 gravity regressions are presented in Table 9 and Table 12.
23to our data, the price data are at the basic-heading level and are for goods with identical
characteristics across retail locations in the participating countries.
6.2.1. Results—EK’s Data
Table 6 presents the results.14 The ﬁrst row simply reports the moments that our estimation
procedure targets. The entry in the third column corresponds with β2, which is EK’sbaseline
estimate of θ.
Table 6: Estimation Results With EK’s Data
Estimate of θ (S.E.) β1 β2
Data Moments — 5.93 8.28
Exactly Identiﬁed Case 3.93 (0.09) 5.93 —
Overidentiﬁed Case 4.42 (0.06) 6.64 8.10
The second row reports the results for exactly identiﬁed estimation, where the underlying
moment used is β1. In this instance, our estimate of θ is 3.93, which is, again, roughly half of
EK’s estimate of θ. The standard error of our estimate is fairly tight.
The third row reports the results for the overidentiﬁed estimation. Here, our estimate of θ
is 4.42. Again, this is substantially below EK’s estimate. Unlike our results in Table 5 with
newer data, the overidentiﬁed case seems to be giving a different value than the exactly
identiﬁed case gives. This contrasts with the Monte Carlo evidence, which suggests that
the estimation procedure should not deliver very different estimates. Furthermore, compar-
ing the data moments in the top row versus the implied moments in the second and third
columns of the third row suggests that the estimation routine is facing challenges ﬁtting the
observed moments. We view this as pointing towards a problem with measurement error in
the data, as EK suggested.
6.3. Discussion
Our estimation results compare favorably with alternative estimates of θ that do not use the
max over price data to approximate trade costs. For example, estimates of θ using ﬁrm-level
14The results from the Step 1 gravity regressions are presented in Table 10 and Table 12.
24data, as in Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) and Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz
(2011), are in the range of 3.6 to 4.8—exactly in the range of values we ﬁnd. EK provide an
alternative estimate of θ using wage data and ﬁnd a value of 3.6. Burstein and Vogel (2009)
estimate θ matching moments regarding the skill intensity of trade and ﬁnd a value of ﬁve.
Simonovska (2010) uses a non-homothetic model of trade featuring variable mark-ups and
calibrates θ to a level of 3.8, which allows her model to match average mark-ups in OECD
countries.
Donaldson (2009) estimates θ as well, and his approach is illuminating relative to the issues
we have raised. His strategy for approximating trade costs is to study differences in the
price of salt across locations in India. In principle, his approach is subject to our critique,
as well—i.e., how could price differences in one good be informative about trade frictions?
However, he argues convincingly that in India, salt was produced in only a few locations
and exported everywhere. Thus, by examining salt, Donaldson (2009) ﬁnds a “binding”
good. Using this approach, he ﬁnds estimates in the range of 3.8-5.2, again consistent with
the range of our estimates of θ.
Finally, it should be noted that the elasticity of trade, θ, is closely related to the elasticity
of substitution between foreign and domestic goods, the Armington elasticity, which deter-
mines the behavior between trade ﬂows and relative prices across a large class of models.
Ruhl (2008) presents a comprehensive discussion of the puzzle regarding this elasticity. In
particular, he argues that international real business-cycle models need low elasticities, in
the range of one to two, to match the quarterly ﬂuctuations in trade balances and the terms
of trade, but static applied general-equilibrium models need high elasticities, between ten
and 15, to account for the growth in trade following trade liberalization. Recently, Imbs and
Mejean (2010) estimate import and export price elasticities for 28 countries within a range of
three to ﬁve. Moreover, using very disaggregate data, Feenstra, Obstfeld, and Russ (2010),
Romalis (2007), Broda and Weinstein (2006), and Hummels (2001) provide estimates for the
Armington elasticity parameter across a large number of industries. Feenstra, Obstfeld, and
Russ’s (2010) median estimate is 4.4; Romalis’s (2007) estimates range between four and 13,
Hummels’s (2001) estimates range between three and eight; while the most comprehensive
work of Broda and Weinstein (2006), who provide tens of thousands of elasticities using
ten-digit HS US data, results in a median value of 3.10.
Given our estimates of θ, it is straightforward to back out the Armington elasticity ρ within
the context of the model of Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), where ρ = θ + 1. Using our
estimates of the elasticity of trade, the implied Armington elasticity ranges between 4.93
and 5.42. This utility parameter also appears in the heterogeneous ﬁrm framework of Melitz
(2003) parameterized by Chaney (2008). Together with the elasticity of trade, θ, the utility
25parameter governs the distribution of ﬁrm sales arising from the model, which has Pareto
tails with a slope given by θ/(ρ − 1). Luttmer (2007) discusses ﬁrm-level evidence that this
slope takes on the value of 1.65, which given our estimates of θ, provides the range of 3.38-
3.68 for ρ. Hence, the Armington elasticity implied by our estimates ranges between 3.38
and 5.42, which falls within the low end of the ranges of estimates of existing studies. Thus,
our results close the gap between (implied) estimates of the elasticity of trade stemming
from a rich demand structure and the ones obtained from the general-equilibrium structure
of a Ricardian model of trade.
7. Why Estimates of θ Matter: The Welfare Gains From Trade
The elasticity parameter θ is key in measuring the welfare gains from trade across a large
class of models. In section 2.1, we argued that θ−1 represents the elasticity of welfare with









Consider a trade liberalization episode that results in a one-percent fall in domestic expendi-
ture share, generating (1/θ)/100 percent increase in consumer welfare. Using the estimates
for θ obtained from the original procedure and the improved simulated method of moments
procedure, roughly eight and four, respectively, the welfare gains from trade would be mis-
measured by a hundred percent. Namely, an estimate for θ of eight would generate a 0.125-
percent welfare increase for a percent fall in the domestic share, while an estimate of four
suggests a 0.25-percent welfare gain from trade, twice as high as the original calculation.
These differences illustrate the importance of obtaining better estimates of trade elasticity.
8. Robustness
8.1. The Number of Goods
The estimation routine requires us to take a stand on the number of goods in the economy.
We argue that the appropriate way to view this issue is to ask: how many goods are needed
to numerically approximate the inﬁnite number of goods in the model? Thus, the number
of goods chosen should be judged on the accuracy of the approximation relative to the com-
putational cost. The choice of the number of goods should not be judged on the basis of how
many goods actually exist in the “real world” because this value is impossible to know or
26discipline.
To understand our argument, recall that our estimation routine is based on a moment con-
dition that compares a biased estimate from the data with a biased estimate using artiﬁcial
data. In Section 3.4, we argued that the bias depends largely on the expected value of the
max over a ﬁnite sample of price differences—i.e., the integral of the left-hand side of equa-
tion (14). Thus, when we compute the biased estimate using artiﬁcial data, we are effectively
computing this integral via simulation.15 This suggests that the number of goods should be
chosen in a way that delivers an accurate approximation of the integral. Furthermore, a
way to judge if the number of goods selected delivers an appropriate approximation is to
increase the number of goods until the estimate of θ does not change too much.
Table 7 shows the results of this analysis. It shows how our estimate of θ varies as the
number of goods in the economy changes, using the EK data and 2005 ICP data. For the EK
data, notice that our estimates are relatively similar across all the different numbers of goods
employed, ranging from 4.14 to 3.93. Moreover, the estimates are effectively the same after
the number of goods is above 100,000, suggesting that this is a reasonable starting point.
Table 7: Results with Different # of Goods
Number of Goods 5,000 25,000 100,000 150,000∗
EK’s Data, Exactly Identiﬁed Case, ˆ θ 4.14 3.99 3.93 3.93
Fraction of Wrong Zeros 0.10 0.03 0.005 0.003
Fraction of Correct Zeros — — — —
2004 ICP Data, Exactly Identiﬁed Case, ˆ θ 5.54 4.67 4.22 4.12
Fraction of Wrong Zeros 0.46 0.31 0.21 0.18
Fraction of Correct Zeros 0.85 0.72 0.55 0.50
The results with the 2005 ICP data vary more depending upon the number of goods used.
While the change from 4.22 to 4.12 when going from 100,000 to 150,000 goods is numerically
large, computational costs force our hand to settle on 150,000 as the number of goods in the
economy.16
15An alternative estimation strategy would be to use different numerical methods to compute the integrals
(14) and then to adjust the EK estimator given this value.
16The reason is that 150,000 goods is near the maximum number of goods feasible while still being able to
execute the simulation routine in parallel on a multi-core machine, which allows a speed-up of just under a
factor of eight.
27Table 7 also reports a side effect of using a low number of goods—zero trade ﬂows between
countries predicted by the model in places where we observe positive trade ﬂows in the
data. Table 7 reports the fraction of zeros that the model produces in instances where there
are positive trade ﬂows observed in the data. With only 5,000 goods, using the 2005 ICP
data set, in almost half of the instances where trade ﬂows are observed in the data, the
model generates a zero. While not as severe, ten percent of positive trade ﬂows are assigned
zeros with the EK data. Results of this nature suggest increasing the number of goods to
minimize the number of wrong zeros, as well.
8.2. Country-Speciﬁc Effects
The price data used in our estimation were collected at the retail level. As such, they nec-
essarily reﬂect local (distribution) costs, sales taxes and mark-ups. These market frictions
do not affect our estimates of the elasticity parameter, for as long as they are country- but
not good-speciﬁc. The basic way to see this is to note that any country-speciﬁc effects will
cancel out in the denominator of (13). This is another reason for using β as a moment in our
estimation routine rather than some other moment.
8.3. Measurement Error
Measurement error in price data is a general concern in empirical work. In our estimation,
error of this nature may artiﬁcially generate larger maximal price differences than implied by
the underlying model. This would result in estimates of θ that are biased downwards. An
advantage of our estimation approach is that one can potentially address this issue directly.
For example, one can take a stand on the form of measurement error, introduce the simu-
lated measurement error into the artiﬁcial data set, and potentially estimate it jointly with
the trade elasticity. While we feel a formal treatment of this issue is beyond the scope of this
paper, we did perform some Monte Carlo experiments with additive log-normal measure-
ment error. We found that the magnitude of measurement error needed to affect our results
was extreme.
8.4. Variable Mark-ups
The price data used in our estimation likely reﬂect retail mark-ups, which are not only
country-, but also retailer-speciﬁc. In order to check whether such variable mark-ups af-
fect our results, we make use of a richer price data set. In particular, we obtain price data
from the EIU Worldwide Cost of Living Survey, which spans 77 of the original 123 countries
28we consider. More importantly, the data are comprised of 111 tradable goods per country,
and the price of each product is recorded once in a supermarket and once in a mid-price
store. We repeat our exercise by ﬁrst using the prices of items collected in mid-price stores,
which appear to be cheaper on average, and then the prices found in supermarkets or chain
stores. We postpone the results until section 8.5.1, since the level of detail in the EIU data
allows us to also address aggregation bias, described there.
8.5. Aggregation
8.5.1. Data Approach
The basic-heading price data employed in our analysis are disaggregated; but, they are not
at the individual-good level. For example, a price observation titled “rice” contains the
average price across different types of rice sampled, such as basmati rice, wild rice, whole-
grain rice, etc. Suppose that basmati rice is the binding good for a pair of countries. In
the ICP data, we compute the difference between the average price of rice between the two
countries, which is smaller than the price difference of basmati rice, if the remaining types
of rice are more equally priced across the two countries. In this case, trade barriers are
underestimated and, consequently, the elasticity of trade is biased upwards.17
In order to alleviate the aggregation problem, Table 8 presents estimates of the elasticity
parameter using EIU’s good-level price data set, which spans a subset of 77 countries from
our original data set, but provides prices for 111 individual tradable goods in two types of
retail stores.18
The results in Table8 suggest that aggregation causesa downward biason trade-barrier esti-
mates, resulting in trade-elasticity estimates that are biased upwards. Indeed, when we use
the highly disaggregate EIU dataset, the elasticity of trade falls to 2.47-2.60. However, retail
mark-ups do not seem to bias the estimates, since the elasticity of trade is not dramatically
different whether high- or low-end store prices are used.
8.5.2. Model Approach
A more structural way to address aggregation bias is to view price data through the lenses
of a monopolistic competition framework (ex. Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008)). In these
17Our aggregation argument is different from the argument by Imbs and Mejean (2009), who demonstrate
that imposing equal elasticities across disaggregated sectors of the economy results in lower elasticity of sub-
stitution estimates than ones obtained by allowing for heterogeneity.
18The results from the Step 1 gravity regressions are presented in Table 11 and Table 12.
29Table 8: Estimation Results With EIU Data
Estimate of θ (S.E.) β1 β2
Cheap Stores
Data Moments — 4.17 5.11
Exactly Identiﬁed Case 2.47 (0.02) 4.17 —
Overidentiﬁed Case 2.48 (0.02) 4.19 5.09
Expensive Stores
Data Moments — 4.39 5.23
Exactly Identiﬁed Case 2.60 (0.02) 4.39 —
Overidentiﬁed Case 2.54 (0.02) 4.29 5.21
models, varieties produced by ﬁrms with identical productivity draws from different source
countries can be thought of as varieties of a good produced with a particular productivity
level. Then, a basic-heading price would represent the average price of all varieties pro-
duced by ﬁrms with a particular productivity draw originating from different source coun-
tries. Simonovska and Waugh (2011) explore the implications of the monopolistic competi-
tion micro-structure for estimates of the elasticity of trade.
9. Conclusion
In this paper, we estimate the elasticity of trade using a simulated method of moments esti-
mator that exploits micro-price data. Our estimates of the elasticity of trade for 123 countries
that comprise most of world output range from 2.47 to 4.42. These results imply a doubling
in the measured welfare gains from trade, relative to existing estimates obtained following
the approach of EK.
The analysis in our paper has broader implications than merely arriving at unbiased es-
timates of the elasticity of trade. Results from Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare
(2011) suggest that heterogeneous ﬁrm and production models provide no value added for
aggregate outcomes over models that abstract from heterogeneity. Our methodological ap-
proach suggests otherwise.
In this paper, we exploit the micro-level structure of EK’s model to provide an estimate of
the elasticity of trade, which is the key parameter to measuring the welfare gains from trade.
30The important insight is that our approach to estimating this key parameter would not have
been possible in models without heterogeneous outcomes. Thus, while the EK, Melitz (2003)
and Chaney (2008) models may provide no new additional gains from trade, their structure
allows us to provide a better estimate of the elasticity of trade than a simple Armington
model would have allowed. The ability to use both measurement and theory in ways that
alternative models would not allow is an important component of the value added that new
heterogeneous ﬁrm and production models of international trade provide.
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A. Data Appendix
A.1. Trade Shares















Putting the numerator and denominator together is simply computing an expenditure share
by dividingthe value of goods country nimported from country iby the total value ofgoods
in country n. The home trade share Xnn
Xn issimply constructed as the residual from one minus
the sum of all bilateral expenditure shares.
To construct
Xni
Xn , the numerator is the aggregate value of manufactured goods that country n
imports from country i. Bilateral trade-ﬂow data are from UN Comtrade for the year 2004.19
We obtain all bilateral trade ﬂows for our sample of 123 countries at the four-digit SITC
19We use data for the year 1990 in section 6.2, which estimates the elasticity of trade using EK’s price data.
33level. We then used concordance tables between four-digit SITC and three-digit ISIC codes
provided by the UN and further modiﬁed by Muendler (2009).20 We restrict our analysis to
manufacturing bilateral trade ﬂows only—namely, those that correspond with manufactur-
ing as deﬁned in ISIC Rev.#2.
The denominator is gross manufacturing production minus manufactured exports (for only
the sample) plus manufactured imports (for only the sample). Gross manufacturing pro-
duction data are the most serious data constraint we faced. We obtain manufacturing pro-
duction data for 2004 from UNIDO for a large sub-sample of countries. We then imputed
gross manufacturing production for countries for which data are unavailable as follows: We
ﬁrst obtain 2004 data on manufacturing (MVA) and agriculture (AVA) value added, as well
as population size (L) and GDP for all countries in the sample. We then impute the gross
output (GO) to manufacturing value added ratio for the missing countries using coefﬁcients






= β0 + βGDPCGDP + βLCL + βMV ACMV A + βAV ACAV A + ǫ,
where βx is a 1x3 vector of coefﬁcients corresponding to Cx, an Nx3 matrix which contains
[log(x),(log(x))2,(log(x))3] for the sub-sample of N countries for which gross output data are
available.
A.2. Prices
The ICP price data we employ in our estimation procedure is reported at the basic-heading
level. A basic heading represents a narrowly-deﬁned group of goods for which expenditure
data are available. For example, basic heading “1101111 Rice” is made up of prices of dif-
ferent types of rice, and the resulting value is an aggregate over these different types of rice.
This implies that a typical price observation of ”Rice” contains different types of rice, as well
as different packaging options that affect the unit price of rice within and across countries.
According to the ICP Handbook, the price of the basic heading ”Rice” is constructed using
a transitive Jevons index of prices of different varieties of rice. To illustrate this point, sup-
pose that the world economy consists of three countries, A,B,C and ten types of rice, 1-10.
Further suppose that consumers in country A have access to all 10 types of rice; those in
country B only have access to types 1-5 of rice; and those in country C have access to types
20The trade data often report bilateral trade ﬂows from two sources. For example, the exports of country A
to country B can appear in the UN Comtrade data as exports reported by country A or as imports reported
by country B. In this case, we take the report of bilateral trade ﬂows between countries A and B that yields a
higher total volume of trade across the sum of all SITC four-digit categories.
344-6 of rice. Although all types of rice are not found in all three countries, it is sufﬁcient that
each pair of countries shares at least one type of rice.
The ICP obtains unit prices for all available types of rice in all three countries and records
a price of 0 if the type of rice is not available in a particular country. The relative price of
rice between countries A and B, based on goods available in these two countries, p
A,B
AB , is a












Similarly, one can compute the relative price of rice between countries A and C (B and C)
based on varieties available in both A and C (B and C). The price of the basic heading ”Rice”

















which is a geometric average that features not only relative prices of rice between countries
A and B, but also cross-prices between A and B linked via country C. This procedure en-
sures that prices of basic headings are transitive across countries and minimizes the impact
of missing prices across countries.
Thus, a basic-heading price is a geometric average of prices of varieties that is directly com-
parable across countries.
B. Proofs
Below, we describe the steps to proving Lemmata 1 and 2. The key part in Lemma 1 is
deriving the distribution of the maximal log price difference. We then prove Propositions 1
and 2.
B.1. Proof of Lemma 1, Lemma 2, and Proposition 1
First, we derive the distribution of the maximal log price difference. The key insight is to
work with direct comparisons of goods’ prices (i.e., do not impose equilibrium and work
from the equilibrium price distribution) and to compute the distribution of log price differ-
35ences and then the distribution of the maximal log price difference.
Having obtained the distribution of the maximum log price difference, we show that the
expected value of the maximum log price difference is biased in a ﬁnite sample and the
estimator ˆ β is biased.
B.1.1. Preliminaries
In deriving the distribution of maximum log price differences, we will work with a rela-
beling of the production functions and exponential distributions following an argument in
Alvarez and Lucas (2007). They relate the pdfs of the exponential and Fr` echet distributions.





i ). To see this, notice that since
yi = h(zi) is a decreasing function, it must be that f(zi)dzi = −g(yi)dyi, where f,g are the
pdf’s of zi,yi, respectively. The result will allow us to characterize moments of the log price
difference by invoking properties of the exponential distribution.
B.1.2. Proof of Lemma 1







k )−θ) be the productivity associated with good z, drawn from the
Fr` echet pdf in country k. By the argument above, the underlying distribution of zk is













































We want to characterize the distribution of (b.2), so we will ﬁrst derive the pdf’s of its com-
ponents. Deﬁne ˜ zik = wθ
kτθ










Next, we derive the distribution of ˜ zi ≡ mink =n[wθ
kτθ
ikzk] = mink =n[˜ zik]. Since each ˜ zik ∼
exp(˜ λik) and independent across countries k, ˜ zi ∼ exp(
 
k =n ˜ λik). Deﬁne ˜ λi ≡
 
k =n ˜ λik.
36Repeat the procedure for importer n in the numerator.















Deﬁne ǫni(z) = log(vni(z)). Taking logs of expression (b.3) gives:
θǫni(z) = min{log(˜ zn),[θlog(wi) + θlog(τni) + log(zi)]} (b.4)
− min{log(˜ zi),[θlog(wn) + θlog(τin) + log(zn)]}
Next, we argue that θǫni(z) ∈ [−θlog(τin),θlog(τni)]. For any good z, θǫni(z) can satisfy one
and only one of the following three cases:
1. Countries n and i buy good z from two different sources. Then,
θǫni(z) = log(˜ zn) − log(˜ zi) (b.5)
2. Country n buys good z from country i. Assuming that trade barriers don’t violate the
triangle inequality, it must be that i buys the good from itself. Then,
θǫni(z) = θlog(wi) + θlog(τni) + log(zi) − θlog(wi) − log(zi) = θlog(τni) (b.6)
3. Country i buys good z from n. Then it must be that n buys the good from itself, so:
θǫni(z) = θlog(wn) + log(zn) − θlog(wn) − θlog(τin) − log(zn) = −θlog(τin) (b.7)
We claim that the following ordering occurs: −θlog(τin) ≤ log(˜ zn) − log(˜ zi) ≤ θlog(τni). To
show this, we need to consider the following two scenarios:
1. Countries n and i buy good z from the same source k. Then,









= θ(log(τnk) − log(τik)) (b.8)
Clearly,
θ(log(τnk) − log(τik)) ≥ −θlog(τin) ⇐⇒ τinτnk ≥ τik,
37where the latter inequality is true under the triangle inequality assumption.
Similarly,
θ(log(τnk) − log(τik)) ≤ θlog(τni) ⇐⇒ τnk ≤ τniτik,
again true by triangle inequality.
2. Country n buys good z from source a and country i from source b, a  = b. We want to

























To ﬁnd the upper bound, take logs of (b.9) and subtract log(wθ
bτθ


















It sufﬁces to show that the right-hand side is itself below the upper bound since, by










⇐⇒ θlog(τnb) − θlog(τib) ≤ θlog(τni)
⇐⇒ τnb ≤ τniτib, (b.12)
which is true by triangle inequality.
The argument for the lower bound is similar. Take logs of (b.10), multiply by −1 (and
reverse inequality) and add log(wθ
aτθ


















It sufﬁces to show that the right-hand side is itself above the lower bound since, by









iaza) ≥ −θ log(τin)
⇐⇒ θlog(τna) − θlog(τia) ≥ −θlog(τin)
⇐⇒ τinτna ≥ τia, (b.14)
which is true by triangle inequality.
Hence, θǫni(z) ∈ [−θlog(τin),θlog(τni)].
Next, we proceed to derive the distribution of θǫni(z) = log(˜ zn)−log(˜ zi). First, we derive the
pdfs of its two components.
Let yi ≡ log(˜ zi). Then ˜ zi = exp(yi). The pdf of yi must satisfy:
f(yi)dyi = g(˜ zi)d˜ zi ⇒ f(yi) = ˜ λi exp(−˜ λi˜ zi)
d˜ zi
dyi
⇒ f(yi) = ˜ λi exp(−˜ λi exp(yi))exp(yi)
⇒ F(yi) = 1 − exp(−˜ λi exp(yi)) (b.15)
The same holds for n.
Now that we have the pdf’s of the two components, we can deﬁne the pdf of ǫ ≡ θǫni(z) ∈
[−θ log(τin),θlog(τni)] as follows:
f(ǫ) ≡ fyn−yi(x) =
  ∞
−∞
fyn(y)fyi(y − x)dy, (b.16)
where we have used the fact that yn and yi are independently distributed hence, the pdf of
their difference is the convolution of the pdfs of the two random variables.




˜ λn exp(−˜ λn exp(y))exp(y)˜ λiexp(−˜ λi exp(y − ǫ))exp(y − ǫ)dy
=
−˜ λn˜ λi
(˜ λn exp(ǫ) + ˜ λi)2


˜ λn exp(y + ǫ) + ˜ λi exp(y) + exp(ǫ)
exp
 











0 + 0 + exp(ǫ)
exp{0}
= exp(ǫ) (b.18)





˜ λn exp(y + ǫ) + ˜ λi exp(y)
exp
 
exp(y)(˜ λn + ˜ λi exp(−ǫ))
 
exp(y)(˜ λn + ˜ λi exp(−ǫ))
= lim
y→∞
˜ λn exp(ǫ) + ˜ λi
exp
 
exp(y)(˜ λn + ˜ λi exp(−ǫ))
 




˜ λn˜ λi exp(ǫ)
(˜ λn exp(ǫ) + ˜ λi)2 (b.20)
The corresponding cdf is:
F(ǫ) =1 −
˜ λi
˜ λn exp(ǫ) + ˜ λi
(b.21)





−1 ˜ λn˜ λi exp(ǫ)




˜ λn exp(θlog(τni)) + ˜ λi
+
˜ λi
˜ λn exp(−θlog(τin)) + ˜ λi
(b.23)






Now that we have these distributions, we compute order statistics from them, which allow
us to characterize the trade barriers estimated from price data. We use the following result:
Given L observations drawn from pdf h(x), the pdf of the r-th order statistic (where r = L
40is the max and r = 1 is the min) is:
hr(x) =
L!




The pdf of the max reduces to:
hmax(x,L) =LH(x)
L−1h(x)







Recall that we are interested in computing the expectation of the maximum logged price
difference between countries n and i. But, so far, we have derived the truncated pdf and cdf
of ǫ = θlog(vni(z)). Our object of interest is actually log(vni(z)) = 1
θǫ. The expectation of this
object, which represents the maximum log price difference, for L draws, is given by:
E[max
z∈L
(log(pn(z)) − log(pi(z)))] =
1
θ















−1 ˜ λn˜ λi exp(ǫ)
(˜ λn exp(ǫ) + ˜ λi)2 (b.28)
Hence, the expectation of the maximum of the log price difference is proportional to 1/θ,
where the proportionality object comes from gravity,
E[max
z∈L
(log(pn(z)) − log(pi(z)))] = Ψni(L;S, ˜ τi, ˜ τn), (b.29)
where:
Ψni(L;S, ˜ τi, ˜ τn) ≡
1
θ
  θ log(τni)
−θ log(τin)
ǫfmax(ǫ,L)dǫ, (b.30)
and the values S and ˜ τn correspond with the deﬁnitions outlined in Deﬁnition 1. It is worth
emphasizing the nature of this integral: Other than the scalar in the front, it depends com-
pletely on objects that can be recovered from the standard gravity equation in (22).
41Finally, one can rewrite equation (b.30) via integration by parts as:
E[max
z∈L
(log(pn(z)) − log(pi(z)))] = logτni −
1
θ





(log(pn(z)) − log(pi(z)))] +
1
θ
  θ log(τni)
−θ log(τin)
Fmax(ǫ,L)dǫ, (b.32)
which implies the following strict inequality:
logτni > E[max
z∈L
(log(pn(z)) − log(pi(z)))] = Ψni(L;S, ˜ τi, ˜ τn), (b.33)
where the strict inequality simply follows from the inspection of the CDF Fmax(ǫ,L) which
has positive mass below the point θlog(τni). This then proves claim 1. in Lemma 1.
To prove claim 2. in Lemma 1, we compute the difference in the expected values of log
prices between two countries. We show that they are equal to the (scaled) difference in the
price parameters Φ.
Rather than working with the distribution described above, it is more convenient to directly
compute the expectation of log prices using the equilibrium price distribution. Note that
EK show that the cdf and pdf of prices in country i are G(p) = 1 − exp(−Φipθ) and g(p) =
pθ−1θΦi exp(−Φipθ), respectively.





Substituting the pdf of prices and then utilizing some algebra to ﬁnd an appropriate change













Our change of variables will set x = log(p), which yields dx/dp = 1/p. Then, integration by














































{γ + log(Φi)}, (b.35)
where γ is the Euler-Mascheroni constant. Finally, using (b.35) and taking the expected dif-
ference in log prices between country n and country i, the scaled Euler-Mascheroni constant
cancels between the two countries and leaves the following expression
E[log(pn(z))] − E[log(pi(z))] = −
1
θ
{log(Φn) − log(Φi)} (b.36)
≡ Ωni(S, ˜ τn, ˜ τi),
which then proves claim 2. in Lemma 1.
B.1.3. Proof of Lemma 2 and Proposition 1



















Given the assumption that the trade data are ﬁxed, equation (b.37) is linear in the random

































by substituting in for the expectation of the maximum log price difference using (b.30), and
the difference in expectations of log prices using (b.36). Inspection of the bracketed term






















with the reason being that Ψni(L) < logτni from Lemma 1; otherwise, the bracketed term
would correspond exactly with equation (5) in logs and, thus, equal one. Now, inverting the





























with the strict inequality following from (b.38) and (b.39). This proves Proposition 1.
B.2. Proof of Proposition 2
In this subsection, we prove Proposition 2. To prove the claims in Proposition 2, we start
with claim 1.
To prove claim 1., we argue that the sample maximum of scaled log price differences is a
consistent estimator of the scaled trade cost. In particular, we argue that as the sample size
becomes inﬁnite, the probability that the sample scaled trade cost is arbitrarily close to the
true scaled trade cost is one.











The cdf of this random variable is the integral of its pdf, which is given in expression (b.28),
overthecompactinterval inwhich thescaledloggedpricedifference lies, [−θlogτin,θlogτni].
44Denote this cdf by F L
max. From (b.28), F L
max ≡ (FT)L, where FT is the truncated distribution
of the scaled log price difference over the domain [−θlogτin,θlogτni]. By deﬁnition, FT and
F L
max take on values between zero and one, as they are cdfs. In particular, for any realization
x < θlogτni, FT(x) < 1. For any L > 1, F L
max(x) = (FT(x))L ≤ FT(x) < 1.
Take L → ∞. Then, for any x ∈ [−θlogτin,θlogτni), F L
max = (FT)L becomes arbitrarily close
to zero since FT < 1. Hence, all the mass of the cdf F L
max becomes concentrated at θlogτni.
Thus, as the sample size becomes inﬁnite, the estimated scaled trade barrier converges to











(logpn(ℓ) − logpi(ℓ)) = logτni. (b.42)
This proves claim 1. of Proposition 2.
To show consistency of the estimator ˆ β, we argue that
plim
L→∞
ˆ β (L;S, ˜ τ,X) = θ, (b.43)





  ˆ β (L;S, ˜ τ,X) − θ  < δ
 
= 1. (b.44)
Basically, we will argue that, by sampling the prices of an ever-increasing set of goods and
applying the estimator β over these prices, with probability one, we will obtain estimates
that are arbitrarily close to θ.
Inverting the expression for the estimator ˆ β in expression (13), rearranging, and multiplying






















  . (b.45)
By assumption, the denominator is trade data and is not a random variable.
In the numerator, log ˆ Pn−log ˆ Pi is the difference in the average of logged prices for countries
n and i, given a sample of L goods. In particular,











45We refer the reader to Davidson and MacKinnon (2004) for a proof of the well known result
that the sample average is both an unbiased and consistent estimator of the mean. Since the
difference operator is continuous, the difference in the sample average of logged price is an
unbiased and consistent estimator of the difference in mean logged prices. Finally, multi-
plying these sample averages by a scalar θ, a continuous operation, ensures convergence to
true difference in the price terms Φ.
We have argued that the two components in the numerator converge in probability to their
true parameter counterparts, as the sample size becomes inﬁnite. Taking the difference of





































































  . (b.47)
To complete the argument, consider the log of expression (5), which involves Φ. Summing















(θlogτni − [logΦi − logΦn]). (b.48)
Substituting expression (b.48) in the denominator of (b.47) above makes the fraction in that
expression equal to unity. Hence, 1/ˆ β converges to 1/θ in probability. Since, for β ∈ (0,∞),
1/ˆ β is a continuous function of ˆ β, ˆ β converges to θ in probability. This proves claim 2. of
Proposition 2.
Claim 3. of Proposition 2 follows from the fact that ˆ β is a consistent estimator of θ (see
Hayashi (2000) for a discussion).
46B.3. Deriving the Inverse Marginal Cost Distribution
To simulate the model, we argue that by using the coefﬁcients S estimated from the gravity
regression (22), we have enough information to simulate prices and trade ﬂows. The key
insight is that the S’s are sufﬁcient to characterize the inverse marginal cost distribution.
Thus, we can sample from this distribution and then compute equilibrium prices and trade
ﬂows.
To see this argument, let zi ∼ Fi(zi) = exp(−Tiz
−θ





i . To ﬁnd the pdf of the transformation ui, mi(ui), use the fact
that fi(zi)dzi = mi(ui)dui, or mi(ui) = fi(zi)(dui/dzi)−1. Let ˜ Si = Tiw
−θ
i . Using fi(zi), ˜ Si, and

































































Clearly mi(ui) is the pdf that corresponds to the cdf Mi(ui) = exp(−˜ Siu
−θ
i ), which concludes
the argument.
47Table 9: 2005 ICP Data, Step 1 Country-Speciﬁc Estimates
Country ˆ Si S.E. exi S.E. Country ˆ Si S.E. exi S.E. Country ˆ Si S.E. exi S.E.
Angola −1.04 0.21 −2.67 0.35 Fiji −0.58 0.20 −2.06 0.31 Nepal 0.48 0.24 −3.00 0.32
Argentina 1.13 0.18 2.34 0.25 Finland 1.09 0.17 2.15 0.23 New Zealand −0.25 0.30 3.17 0.24
Armenia 0.83 0.20 −3.91 0.29 France 0.39 0.16 5.09 0.22 Nigeria −0.85 0.25 −1.00 0.29
Australia 0.24 0.16 3.59 0.23 Gabon −1.07 0.18 −1.52 0.27 Norway 0.33 0.37 1.88 0.23
Austria 0.39 0.16 2.71 0.22 Gambia, The −2.40 0.22 −2.32 0.34 Oman −0.19 0.36 −0.74 0.26
Azerbaijan −0.03 0.20 −2.76 0.28 Georgia −2.78 0.19 0.70 0.27 Pakistan 0.55 0.29 2.03 0.23
Bangladesh 0.76 0.18 0.46 0.24 Germany 0.40 0.16 5.57 0.22 Paraguay 0.04 0.36 −0.74 0.28
Belarus 1.27 0.18 −0.98 0.25 Ghana −1.32 0.21 0.44 0.29 Peru 0.47 0.24 1.10 0.25
Belgium −2.75 0.16 8.26 0.22 Greece 0.78 0.16 0.58 0.23 Philippines −0.34 0.39 2.64 0.24
Benin −0.62 0.22 −3.66 0.36 Guinea −1.76 0.22 −2.16 0.33 Poland 0.84 0.34 1.76 0.23
Bhutan 0.37 0.30 −5.45 0.43 Guinea-Bissau −0.40 0.28 −5.77 0.48 Portugal −0.20 0.24 2.71 0.23
Bolivia 0.28 0.19 −1.65 0.29 Hungary 0.86 0.17 0.98 0.23 Romania 0.60 0.25 0.75 0.23
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1.14 0.23 −3.68 0.32 Iceland −0.26 0.18 −0.55 0.26 Russian Federation 1.32 0.34 2.12 0.23
Botswana 0.97 0.25 −3.73 0.37 India 0.94 0.16 3.53 0.25 Rwanda 0.09 0.27 −5.05 0.36
Brazil 1.30 0.16 3.67 0.23 Indonesia 1.34 0.16 3.07 0.23 Sierra Leone −0.97 0.25 −3.61 0.41
Brunei Darussalam 1.68 0.25 −5.15 0.37 Iran, Islamic Rep. 1.02 0.21 −0.85 0.28 Saudi Arabia 0.70 0.30 0.70 0.28
Bulgaria 0.30 0.17 0.39 0.24 Ireland −3.21 0.16 6.39 0.22 Senegal −0.86 0.27 −0.63 0.25
Burkina Faso 0.32 0.20 −4.07 0.31 Israel 0.59 0.17 1.70 0.24 Slovak Republic −0.31 0.26 1.34 0.23
Burundi −1.52 0.20 −3.12 0.34 Italy 0.58 0.16 4.56 0.22 Slovenia 1.02 0.38 −0.20 0.24
Cameroon 1.54 0.21 −3.34 0.30 Japan 1.51 0.16 4.89 0.23 South Africa 0.41 0.25 3.61 0.23
Canada −0.27 0.16 4.59 0.22 Jordan −0.25 0.18 −0.65 0.25 Spain 0.29 0.31 4.09 0.22
Cape Verde −0.37 0.21 −4.86 0.38 Kazakhstan 0.28 0.18 −0.03 0.26 Sri Lanka −0.14 0.42 0.65 0.25
Central African Republic 0.55 0.25 −4.67 0.36 Kenya −0.53 0.16 −0.07 0.23 Sudan −0.12 0.33 −3.47 0.32
Chad 0.54 0.24 −6.49 0.40 Korea, Rep. 1.04 0.16 4.38 0.22 Swaziland 2.10 0.38 −3.30 0.33
Chile 0.27 0.18 1.96 0.25 Kyrgyz Republic 0.03 0.20 −2.86 0.30 Sweden 0.75 0.31 3.34 0.22
China 1.13 0.16 5.74 0.23 Lao PDR 1.43 0.27 −3.92 0.35 Switzerland 0.10 0.25 3.69 0.27
Colombia 0.38 0.17 0.50 0.24 Latvia −0.46 0.19 −0.10 0.26 Syrian Arab Republic −0.34 0.31 −0.86 0.26
Comoros −0.84 0.27 −4.54 0.42 Lebanon 0.60 0.20 −2.29 0.28 Tajikistan 1.10 0.37 −3.19 0.34
Congo, Dem. Rep. −0.65 0.24 −2.31 0.34 Lesotho 1.09 0.30 −5.44 0.44 Tanzania −1.01 0.26 −1.41 0.31
Congo, Rep. −0.95 0.21 −1.08 0.30 Lithuania 0.67 0.21 −0.88 0.29 Thailand 0.86 0.29 3.57 0.28
Cte d’Ivoire 0.78 0.21 −1.22 0.30 Macedonia, FYR 0.41 0.18 −2.71 0.27 Togo −1.40 0.25 −1.34 0.27
Croatia 1.08 0.16 −1.29 0.24 Malawi −0.63 0.19 −2.59 0.28 Tunisia 0.34 0.36 −0.30 0.24
Cyprus −0.86 0.17 0.45 0.24 Malaysia −1.43 0.16 6.58 0.22 Turkey 0.93 0.28 2.38 0.23
Czech Republic 0.43 0.16 2.02 0.23 Mali −1.03 0.23 −2.66 0.32 Uganda −0.71 0.29 −2.30 0.26
Denmark −0.24 0.16 3.63 0.23 Mauritania −1.97 0.23 −1.79 0.33 Ukraine 1.41 0.24 0.88 0.28
Djibouti −2.04 0.24 −2.37 0.38 Mauritius −1.63 0.17 1.44 0.24 United Kingdom −0.29 0.32 5.59 0.22
Ecuador −0.24 0.18 0.12 0.26 Mexico 0.21 0.16 2.61 0.24 United States 0.06 0.34 6.87 0.22
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.44 0.17 0.62 0.23 Moldova −0.47 0.19 −2.12 0.29 Uruguay −0.51 0.29 1.40 0.27
Equatorial Guinea 0.47 0.24 −4.24 0.39 Morocco −0.39 0.17 1.32 0.23 Venezuela, RB 0.72 0.29 −0.60 0.26
Estonia −1.74 0.17 1.61 0.24 Mozambique −0.16 0.22 −2.06 0.33 Vietnam −0.44 0.24 2.69 0.28
Ethiopia −0.66 0.21 −2.15 0.31 Namibia 1.09 0.23 −3.64 0.33 Zambia −3.99 0.30 2.59 0.27
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8Table 10: EK Data, Step 1 Country-Speciﬁc Estimates
Country ˆ Si S.E. exi S.E. Country ˆ Si S.E. exi S.E.
Australia −0.20 0.15 0.54 0.24 Japan 2.54 0.13 1.74 0.21
Austria 0.50 0.12 −1.65 0.18 Netherlands −3.09 0.12 0.80 0.18
Belgium −4.38 0.12 0.98 0.18 New Zealand −1.42 0.15 0.37 0.24
Canada −0.46 0.13 1.06 0.22 Norway −0.34 0.12 −1.01 0.18
Denmark −1.16 0.12 −0.67 0.18 Portugal −0.28 0.12 −1.38 0.19
Finland 0.82 0.12 −1.33 0.18 Spain 1.56 0.12 −1.35 0.18
France 1.15 0.12 0.05 0.18 Sweden 0.05 0.12 −0.06 0.18
Germany 1.44 0.12 0.82 0.18 United Kingdom 0.52 0.12 0.89 0.18
Greece −0.38 0.12 −2.51 0.18 United States 1.34 0.13 2.83 0.22
Italy 1.81 0.12 −0.12 0.18
Table 10: EIU Data, Step 1 Country-Speciﬁc Estimates
Country ˆ Si S.E. exi S.E. Country ˆ Si S.E. exi S.E. Country ˆ Si S.E. exi S.E.
Argentina 0.71 0.17 0.74 0.24 Iceland −0.06 0.17 −3.09 0.24 Poland 0.56 0.16 0.26 0.23
Australia −0.23 0.16 2.19 0.24 India 0.54 0.16 1.76 0.24 Portugal −0.03 0.16 0.31 0.23
Austria 0.11 0.16 1.31 0.23 Indonesia 1.01 0.16 1.39 0.23 Romania 0.13 0.16 −0.42 0.23
Azerbaijan 0.06 0.17 −5.28 0.25 Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.75 0.18 −2.71 0.26 Russian Federation 1.17 0.16 0.55 0.24
Belgium −2.79 0.16 6.16 0.23 Ireland −3.13 0.16 4.65 0.23 Saudi Arabia 0.22 0.18 −0.59 0.26
Brazil 0.59 0.16 2.33 0.23 Israel 0.08 0.17 0.37 0.24 Senegal −0.70 0.17 −3.76 0.25
Brunei Darussalam 1.59 0.21 −7.49 0.32 Italy 0.35 0.16 2.93 0.23 Slovak Republic −0.45 0.16 −0.21 0.23
Bulgaria 0.03 0.17 −1.23 0.24 Japan 1.09 0.16 3.49 0.23 South Africa 0.00 0.16 1.76 0.23
Canada −0.44 0.16 2.89 0.23 Jordan −0.81 0.17 −1.88 0.24 Spain 0.03 0.16 2.48 0.23
Central African Republic 0.69 0.21 −7.07 0.31 Kazakhstan 0.55 0.17 −2.45 0.24 Sri Lanka −0.25 0.17 −1.06 0.24
Chile −0.04 0.17 0.56 0.24 Kenya −0.65 0.16 −2.69 0.24 Sweden 0.42 0.16 1.86 0.23
China 0.71 0.16 4.04 0.23 Korea, Rep. 0.58 0.16 3.06 0.23 Switzerland −0.04 0.18 2.05 0.25
Colombia 0.11 0.16 −1.18 0.24 Malaysia −1.93 0.16 5.33 0.23 Syrian Arab Republic −0.41 0.17 −3.04 0.24
Cote d’Ivoire 0.80 0.18 −3.42 0.27 Mexico −0.23 0.16 1.43 0.24 Thailand 0.51 0.18 1.87 0.25
Czech Republic 0.05 0.16 0.68 0.23 Morocco −0.47 0.16 −0.65 0.23 Tunisia 0.10 0.16 −2.02 0.24
Denmark −0.37 0.16 1.74 0.23 Nepal 0.43 0.21 −5.07 0.28 Turkey 0.71 0.16 0.51 0.23
Ecuador −0.32 0.17 −1.84 0.24 New Zealand −0.62 0.17 1.75 0.24 Ukraine 1.52 0.18 −1.21 0.26
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.29 0.16 −1.30 0.23 Nigeria −1.02 0.18 −2.98 0.26 United Kingdom −0.38 0.16 3.71 0.23
Ethiopia −0.68 0.18 −4.15 0.27 Norway 0.35 0.16 0.00 0.23 United States −0.25 0.16 5.19 0.23
Finland 0.60 0.16 0.93 0.23 Oman −0.36 0.17 −2.94 0.25 Uruguay −0.53 0.18 −0.59 0.25
France 0.38 0.16 3.04 0.23 Pakistan 0.30 0.16 0.09 0.23 Venezuela, RB 0.85 0.17 −2.51 0.24
Germany 0.11 0.16 3.95 0.23 Paraguay −0.03 0.18 −3.03 0.26 Vietnam −0.37 0.18 0.63 0.26
Greece 0.33 0.16 −0.92 0.23 Peru 0.22 0.17 −0.73 0.24 Zambia −1.91 0.17 −1.84 0.26
Hungary 0.59 0.16 −0.17 0.23 Philippines −0.72 0.16 1.50 0.23
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9Table 12: Step 1 Trade Cost Estimates and Summary Statistics
Geographic Barriers ICP 2005 Data EK Data EIU Data
Barrier Parameter Estimate S.E. Parameter Estimate S.E. Parameter Estimate S.E.
[0,375) − 5.30 0.21 −2.89 0.14 −5.02 0.19
[375,750) − 6.29 0.14 −3.56 0.10 −5.28 0.11
[750,1500) − 7.27 0.09 −3.87 0.07 −5.71 0.07
[1500,3000) − 8.50 0.06 −4.10 0.15 −6.63 0.05
[3000,6000) − 9.65 0.04 −6.15 0.09 −7.70 0.04
[6000,maximum] −10.35 0.05 −6.60 0.10 −8.41 0.04
Shared border 1.25 0.12 0.44 0.14 1.04 0.16
Summary Statistics
ICP 2005 Data EK Data EIU Data
No. Obs 10,513 342 4,607
TSS 152,660 2,936 47,110
SSR 30,054 76.56 8,208
σ2
ν 2.93 0.25 1.84
5
0